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[Author’s Note: The views expressed in this article are those of the 
author and do not necessarily reflect those of the U.S. National 
Commission on Libraries and Information Science.] 
THISARTICLE REVIEWS the roles of the three branches of government 
in making policy for national security controls on information. It 
reviews legislative actions (statutes, appropriations, hearings) and 
executive actions (executive orders, regulations, contract provisions) 
in the post-war era with a focus on developments during the Carter, 
Reagan, and Bush presidencies. 
INTRODUCTION 
All three branches of the federal government-legislative, 
executive, and judicial-have a role in making information policy 
and, more specifically, in making policies governing national security 
controls over information. Such controls are most frequently exercised 
over technological data, data of a sensitive military nature, or 
information critical for trade considerations. In providing the various 
controls in effect today, the three branches have acted within the 
broad operational bounds provided by the Constitution-i.e., the 
legislature makes laws which are then interpreted and enforced by 
the executive with the judciary having powers of final oversight. 
HISTORY 
A brief review of major national security actions since World 
Sandra N. Milevski, U.S. National Commission on  Libraries and Information Science, 
1111 18th Street, NW, Suite 310, Washington, DC 20036 
LIBRARY TRENDS, Vol. 39, Nos. 1 & 2, Summer/Fall 1990, pp. 132-44 
Q 1991 The Board of Trustees, University of Illinois 
MILEVSKI/CONTROLS ON INFORMATION 133 
War I1 traces the development and expansion of the concept. In the 
period immediately preceding and including the war, national 
security considerations were strictly limited to military affairs. The 
year 1940 marked the first in a series of Executive Orders (E.O.) issued 
by the president to establish policies and procedures for classifying 
information; E.O. 8381 (Roosevelt) served as the basis for all later 
executive revisions of the national security information classification 
system. In 1946, Congress took a more extreme stance than the 
president with enactment of the Atomic Energy Act, which was born 
of the secretive wartime Manhattan Project. This law provided that, 
unlike other military information which was to be reviewed and then 
classified, all nuclear-related information was automatically classified 
from its creation, regardless of its ownership and whether i t  was 
created in the public or private sectors. The 1950 Espionage Act 
provided for communications secrecy, including cryptography, and 
certain patent applications were to be delayed to protect them from 
public disclosure under the Invention Secrecy Act. 
In 1947 the omnibus National Security Act revamped the 
organization of the entire defense establishment. It established the 
National Security Council (NSC) and the Central Intelligence Agency 
(CIA) and gave the latter responsibility for intelligence operations. 
In 1951 President Truman issued E.O. 10290 which stirred some 
controversy because i t  included in the national security classification 
system, for the first time, nonmilitary as well as military agencies. 
The emphasis was slowly changing from a wartime to a post-war 
mentality, and by 1954 the Atomic Energy Act was revised to meet 
the needs and concerns of private enterprises involved in the nuclear 
industry. 
Over the next two decades, four Executive Orders refined the 
classification system: E.O. 10104 and 10501 (Eisenhower, 1953); E.O. 
11652 (Nixon, 1972); and E.O. 12065 (Carter, 1978). The Nixon E.O. 
marked an expansion of the concept of national security by adding 
“foreign relations” (a vague term exceeding policy considerations 
to include diplomacy and operations) to the national defense formula 
to comprise national security. The Carter E.O. limited the extent 
of classification by introducing two new criteria for classification: 
(1) damage to national security had to be identifiable and not just 
potential, and (2) when deciding whether to declassify a previously 
classified document, officials were to apply a “balancing test” of 
whether the value of the information to the public exceeded the threat 
to national security. 
The executive has perhaps more leeway in establishing national 
security controls than the other two branches of government because 
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of its dominance in the foreign relations domain, its many agencies 
writing regulations that interpret the laws of Congress, and its ability 
to act quickly and seize the initiative when compared with the 
legislature and the judiciary. Harold C. Relyea (1987) has said that 
“national security remains a largely ambiguous concept of ten 
appearing but otherwise undefined in Federal statutes, given 
considerable deference and latitude by the judiciary, and affording 
the executive enormous power and broad discretion regarding its 
application” (p.22). 
The federal agencies most frequently involved in national 
security controls include the Departments of Commerce (export ’ 
controls), Defense (contract provisions), Energy (nuclear informa- 
tion), and State (immigration). National security considerations have 
prompted these agencies, as well as components of the Executive 
Office of the president such as the National Security Council, the 
Central Intelligence Agency, and the Office of Management and 
Budget, to classify information and impose other secrecy restrictions, 
limit the export of goods and information, delay or prevent the 
issuance of patents, and attempt to censor the communications of 
certain classes of citizens, such as scientists and federal employees 
and contractors. 
Over the past decade in particular, the content and manner of 
implementation by the executive branch of various national security 
controls over information have engendered controversy because of 
their circumscription of national traditions of intellectual freedom 
and international traditions of open scientific communication. This 
trend began in the late 1970s during the Carter Administration when 
various scientific, educational, and other types of exchanges between 
the Soviet Union and the United States were curtailed; when the 
administration sought to forestall publication of the (unclassified) 
memoirs of a former CIA operative and of information on assembling 
a hydrogen bomb, and when the unprovoked Soviet invasion of 
Afghanistan in December 1979 brought detente to a crashing halt. 
A series of “spy scandals,” unfolding over several years, followed. 
During this time the first attempts by the government to limit 
scientific communication were begun, and the Supreme Court in 
h e @ @v. United States (1980)decided that secrecy agreements imposed 
upon the intelligence community are constitutional. 
Concern over the outflow of U.S. technological information was 
genuine and widespread among those knowledgeable in the area; 
i t  was not a creation of overzealous government censors. In the late 
1970s commercial competitors and hostile military parties stepped 
up  their efforts to acquire such data. The Soviet Union in particular 
shifted from an exclusively military focus to an all-inclusive one, 
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targeting the civilian sector and universities as well. These efforts 
prompted Admiral Bobby R. Inman (1982) to utter his famous remark 
about the “hemorrhage of the country’s technology.” Various 
professional societies reviewed the situation, and the American 
Council on Education recommended voluntary prepublication review 
for sensitive manuscripts in the field of cryptography. A 1976 
Department of Defense task force chaired by J. Fred Bucy, president 
of Texas Instruments, had already emphasized the need to hold back 
the technology but not the basic science. It was the Bucy Report 
(Dept. of Defense, 1976) which introduced the concept of “critical 
technologies” which was the basis of the 1979 Export Administration 
Act. Thus controversy surrounding national security controls stems 
not from their need, but  from the degree and methods of 
implementation. 
The federal government’s statutory authority to impose national 
security controls is elaborated by executive branch administrative 
regulations, contract provisions stemming from them, and 
presidential directives. Pertinent statutes include the aforementioned 
Atomic Energy Act, the Invention Secrecy Act, the Arms Export 
Control Act, the Export Administration Act, the Immigration and 
Nationality Act (McCarran Act), plus the federal agency-generated 
regulations governing their implementation. The well-known 
Freedom of Information Act does not apply to national security 
considerations as explained later. 
STATUTESAND COMPANIONREGULATIONS 
Enacted in 1946 and amended in 1954, the Atomic Energy Act 
establishes a category of data-“restricted data”-dealing with atomic 
weapons and nuclear materials over which the federal government 
has exclusive jurisdiction, regardless of the creator of the data. Private 
individuals or enterprises creating such data with private funds as 
well as federally funded contractors and federal employees are equally 
liable under this law, which was the authority cited in 1979 when 
the Carter Administration opposed The  Progressive, which published 
directions for assembling a hydrogen bomb. In 1981 Congress further 
amended this act to allow the Secretary of Energy to halt the 
dissemination of unclassified information if i t  could have a negative 
effect on the common defense or on public health and safety. In 
April 1985, the Department of Energy completed work on and issued 
the final regulations accompanying this amendment which prohibits 
the unauthorized disclosure of “Unclassified Controlled Nuclear 
Information” (UCNI). 
The Invention Secrecy Act (1951) is designed to allow the federal 
government to control private technological data revealed in patent 
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applications if it might harm national security. Developed for wartime 
situations and made permanent in 1952, i t  charges the Patent 
Commissioner with reviewing patent applications and if, in his 
opinion, their disclosure might be detrimental, passing them on to 
the defense agencies for review. The agencies may decide for secrecy, 
in which case the Patent Office may withhold any given patent for 
one year. This period of time may be extended, but the applicant 
may also appeal to the Secretary of Commerce and make claims for 
damages and compensation through the court system. 
The Arms Export Control Act (1976) controls the export of goods 
and materials from the United States and the access which foreign 
citizens may have to the same within this country. Such controls 
have been in place for over fifty years, first under a joint resolution 
of Congress (1935), then under the Neutrality Act (1937-39) and the 
Mutual Security Act (1954). The International Traffic in Arms 
Regulations (ITAR) that accompany the act include certain scientific 
information-“technical data”-as a category of exportable (or 
nonexportable) good, and, in addition, define the term “export” so 
broadly as to encompass release of the informatien within the United 
States. The Department of State, with the assistance of the Department 
of Defense, maintains the companion list of embargoed goods-the 
U.S. Munitions List. The term “list” is a misnomer since its size 
approximates that of the Manhattan telephone directory. 
The more recent Export Administration Act (1979, as amended 
in 1981, 1985, and 1988) has a similar function and is implemented 
through the Export Administration Regulations. The Department 
of Commerce maintains the accompanying Commodity Control List 
for dual use items, while Commerce along with Defense and Energy 
compile the Militarily Critical Technologies List. The latter list, over 
700 pages long, is itself a classified document. 
The original Export Administration Act was due to expire 
automatically during the 98th Congress. As the Congress progressed 
and lawmakers realized that they would not be able to complete a 
full reauthorization before the act lapsed, they twice passed legislation 
temporarily extending it  from September 30, 1983to October 14, 1983 
(PL 98-108) and again from February 29, 1984 to March 30, 1984 
(PL 98-222). However, Congress failed to pass a permanent law before 
its expiration on March 30 and before the conclusion of the 98th 
Congress, and President Reagan issued an Executive Order (E.O. 
12470) on that same day, just as he had in the interim period between 
October and February. Both Executive Orders declared a state of 
national emergency and invoked the International Emergency 
Economic Powers Act to continue the export controls. When the 
99th Congress finally passed the Export Administration Amendments 
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Act of 1985 (PL 99-64), the president revoked the state of emergency 
with another E.O. (12525). This seesaw serves to illustrate the superior 
speed and flexibility which the executive enjoys over the relatively 
lumbering pace of Congress. 
As of this writing, the most recent revisions to the rules governing 
the Commodity Control List were published by Commerce’s Bureau 
of Export Administration in the February 28, 1989 Federal Register. 
Amendments made to the Export Administration Act by the 1988 
Omnibus Trade and Competitiveness Act (PL 100-418) called for 
changes that include enhancing multilateral controls over technology 
exports, easing exports to the People’s Republic of China, simplifying 
licensing requirements, reducing processing times, reducing the size 
of the list, and defining the roles of the various agencies involved 
(the act also provided penalties for Toshiba Machine Company and 
Kongsberg Vaapenfabrik, which sold controlled technology to the 
USSR). Other changes in the regulations stemmed from recommen- 
dations of the Secretaries of State and Energy and from multilateral 
strategic controls reviews held by the United States and allied 
countries through the coordinating committee (COCOM). 
A recently enacted law expands the two export control acts 
explained earlier. The Department of Defense Authorization Act for 
fiscal year 1984 (PL 98-94) allows DoD to withhold technical data 
under its control from domestic public disclosure if those data fall 
under nonexportable categories on any of the lists or if they require 
a license or approval for export. Two DoD directives issued in 
November 1984 elaborate on the law. This provision reinforces the 
earlier regulations’ broad interpretation of the definition of “export,” 
which includes the domestic dissemination of information to be kept 
from foreign nationals. The key terms within the context of these 
three statutes are “technical data” and “export”; any data or 
information falling under these terms need not undergo the 
classification process for dissemination to be prohibited. The 1985 
regulations provide for a system of seven levels of markings 
(unclassified/unlimited; DoD; DoD and contractors; federal 
government; federal government and contractors; special class; subject 
to export control) on documents to identify the type of source and 
to expedite release of the information without the need to trace the 
originating organization (Young, 1985). 
A final statute providing authority for the application of national 
security controls within the United States is the Immigration and 
Nationality Act (“McCarran Act,” 1952) which allows the Department 
of State to deny entry to this country to foreign nationals because 
of their political and ideological beliefs. Upheld by the Supreme 
Court in Kleindienst u. Mandel (1972), this act serves as the basis 
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for actions started in the late 1970s by the Department of State, 
sometimes in conjunction with Commerce in its export control 
capacity, to prevent foreign scientists, students, and others from 
acquiring sensitive information through participation in conferences, 
attending classes in certain subjects, or performing laboratory 
research. 
The first well-known incident occurred in February 1980 when 
the American Vacuum Society was forced to rescind invitations to 
its international meeting. Early in 1981 the State Department informed 
Cornell University that certain East European foreign visitors would 
be limited to classroom activities. In the fall of that year, the State 
Department advised university administrators to exclude students 
from the People’s Republic of China from studies and/or research 
in certain fields. 
The limitations on scientific communication and academic 
freedom which these visa conditioning and campus policing 
requirements represented mobilized the science and academic 
communities, which have released a series of reports on the matter. 
Early examples are the landmark September 1982 National Academy 
of Sciences (1982) report “Scientific Communication and National 
Security,” based on findings of a panel chaired by Dale R. Corson 
and the April 1984 American Association for the Advancement of 
Science compilation of all visa and import control incidents affecting 
professional societies and their meetings. In September 1985, the 
presidents of twelve scientific and engineering societies sent a letter 
to the Secretary of Defense to state that their organizations would 
no longer allow restricted meeting sessions. The government has 
responded to these concerns through a number of mechanisms-such 
as a 1982 Defense Science Board Task Force on University 
Responsiveness to National Security Requirements report, a 1983 
statement by the State Department on applying appropriate McCarran 
Act restrictions when denying or restricting visas, an ad hoc DoD- 
University Forum chartered in 1984 as a permanent advisory 
committee to the DoD. Later presidential directives do not indicate 
a change of direction. 
Although this listing indicates major laws from which the 
executive agencies derive authority to promulgate national security 
controls regulations, it is not exhaustive. Some narrower statutes, 
in turn, elaborate on actions derived from the president’s authority. 
One example is the Classified Information Procedures Act which 
governs the introduction of classified information in open court and 
was recently an issue in the Oliver North trial (Lardner, 1989). 
Although the Freedom of Information Act (1966) is the best 
known vehicle for obtaining from the federal government what 
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otherwise might be closely held information, it does not apply in 
cases with national security considerations. Thus national security 
information is excluded from FOIA requests as a category. The FOIA 
codifies the citizens’ right to know as based in the First Amendment 
right to petition; previously, the release of federal information was 
at the agencies’ discretion, which frequently operated on a need-to- 
know basis. However, the law specifies nine categories of information 
which may be (but do not necessarily have to be) protected from 
disclosure. These include.categories: (1 ) information already properly 
classified as secret under an executive order; (3)  information excepted 
from disclosure by a statute which specifies withholding in either 
a nondiscretionary manner, or according to particular criteria, or 
by broader categories or types; and (4)trade secrets or privileged 
or confidential commercial or financial information (most FOIA 
requests are from commercial enterprises seeking information about 
their competitors). Thus national security information is excluded 
from FOIA requests as a category. 
The FOIA was amended and strengthened in 1975 to provide 
the same kind of court review for national security information as 
for other information, but in the 98th Congress an exemption from 
FOIA requests was granted for certain CIA operational files. Because 
the FOIA applies exclusively to the executive branch of the 
government (Congress having exempted itself from FOIA require- 
ments, as it frequently does with other legislation), i t  sets up  a 
situation of ongoing tension between the people’s right to know 
and the exercise of the chief executive’s executive privilege, a doctrine 
of refusal to divulge state secrets practiced by every president since 
George Washington. 
CONTRACTPROVISIONS 
A third source of authority within the federal government for 
instituting national security controls stems from its power of the 
purse. The ultimate power to allocate funds lies with Congress, which 
can, however, authorize a program but in effect kill i t  by not providing 
an appropriation of funds for its operation. For national security 
applications, however, this power is most often exercised on a daily 
basis by the Department of Defense through its spending in support 
of research and development and on various commercial contracts. 
Thus the department may impose secrecy requirements on the results 
of research conducted not only by federal employees but also by private 
parties in industry or academe whose projects are even partially 
federally funded. According to, experts at the American Physical 
Society, some 75 percent of all federally funded research and 
development performed in this country is DoD-sponsored, and the 
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DoD share of basic research and academic science, where i t  is not 
dominant, is steadily increasing (R. L. Park, Director, Office of Public 
Affairs, American Physical Society, to author, personal communi- 
cation, November 1987). Even when the agency does not impose its 
own restrictions through contract provisions or cannot invoke the 
export licensing requirements or security classification, a contractor 
who fails to comply with agency wishes in such matters decreases 
his chances of being awarded subsequent contracts. 
PRESIDENTIALDIRECTIVES 
The series of executive orders mentioned earlier established and 
developed the classification system and identified seven categories 
of information which could be classified. These are listed in E.O. 
12065 (1978) as: (a) military plans, weapons, or operations; (b) foreign 
government information; (c) intelligence activities, sources, or 
methods; (d) foreign relations or foreign activities of the United States; 
(e) scientific, technological, or economic matters relating to national 
security; ( f )  U.S. government programs for safeguarding nuclear 
materials or facilities; or (g)other categories of information which 
are related to national security and which require protection against 
unauthorized disclosure. 
In April 1982, the Reagan Administration issued the latest 
presidential revision of the classification system as E.O. 12356 to take 
effect that August. This executive order reversed the previous trend 
toward greater openness by introducing a number of changes. The 
executive order: 
-removed the presumption in favor of a less restrictive classification 
or no classification in cases of “reasonable doubt”; 
-removed the “identifiable damage” criterion and replaced it  with 
a reasonable expectation of damage; 
-cancelled the automatic declassification of documents after six years 
and provided for classification as long as required by national 
security considerations; 
-removed 	 the requirement to balance public interest with the need 
to protect national security (“balancing test”); 
-provided new authority for officials to reclassify after a document 
had been declassified or was already in the public domain; 
-added the option, at agency discretion, of classifying privately 
funded basic research, which was previously excluded. 
Developed without the opportunity for public comment and the 
object of extensive Congressional criticism in oversight hearings (U.S. 
Congress, 1982), this E.O. now defines the classification process and 
serves as a basis for further executive branch agency actions. 
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In December 1982, the administration extended its nondisclosure 
efforts from classified to unclassified information by establishing an 
interagency task force to review the vulnerability of sensitive 
information which did not meet classification guidelines. The 
following March, the administration issued National Security 
Decision Directive (NSDD) 84, which targeted federal employees as 
potential sources of sensitive information but also included federal 
contractors in its scope. In its original form, NSDD 84 mandated 
lifelong nondisclosure agreements for federal employees with security 
clearances, prepublication reviews of works written by employees with 
the highest security clearances (i.e., access to “Sensitive Compart- 
mented Information” [SCI]), polygraph examinations in the course 
of investigations, and strictures on contacts between employees and 
the media. 
That same fall, Congress placed over a dozen limitations on 
NSDD 84 including prohibition of polygraph examinations and 
limitations on several SCI provisions. Undaunted, the administration 
tried again in November 1985 with NSDD 196, itself a classified 
document. This directive, administered by the CIA, required all agency 
personnel with access to SCI (estimated at over 182,000 federal 
employees and contractors) (ALA, 1986) to submit to polygraph 
examinations. The controversy aroused was sufficient to prompt the 
administration to rescind the directive in September 1986. (Congress 
followed up by passing PL 100-347 which the president signed into 
law in June 1988. The law restricts the use of polygraph examinations 
by private sector employers, but federal and state governments as 
well as national security agencies and their contractors are among 
the exemptions.) 
In the meantime, Standard Form 4193, a lifelong prepublication 
agreement for those with access to SCI, had been introduced to 
supplement the much more common Standard Form 189, the result 
of NSDD 84. This pledge not to reveal classified or classifiable 
information applies to all federal employees with security clearances 
and introduced the concept of “sensitive but not classified 
information.” The definition of classifiable information provided in 
the Federal Register ( 1987a) elicited sufficient negative comment to 
be later revised (1987b) to eliminate currently unclassified information 
which might, at some future time, become classified. By December 
1987, Congress had taken temporary action to bar the use of both 
of these standard forms (language in 1987 and 1988 appropriations 
bills prohibiting the use of appropriated funds to produce or 
disseminate SF-189), but many previously signed pledges are still 
extant. 
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Under President Bush, SF-312, developed in 1988 to succeed SF- 
189, defines classified information as including written and oral 
communications that, if they were written, would be classified or 
in the process of being classified. It provided for punishment of federal 
employees who divulge information that they know or should know 
is classified or is in the process of being classified. In the 1990 Treasury, 
Post Office, and General Government Appropriations bill, Congress 
again prohibited the use of federal funds to print or disseminate 
SF-312; President Bush protested that language but signed the bill 
into law nevertheless. 
Another presidential directive of September 1984, NSDD 145, dealt 
only with information in electronic format and focused on security 
safeguards for telecommunications, computer systems, and other 
automated information systems handling sensitive but unclassified 
government information. It promoted a comprehensive, coordinated 
approach on the assumption that isolated items of unclassified 
information, when aggregated with other such items, could, in sum, 
reveal sensitive matters. However, the directive did not define what 
such sensitive but unclassified information is. 
An October 1986 memorandum signed by then-National Security 
Adviser John M. Poindexter (NTISSP #2 “National Policy on 
Protection of Sensitive but Unclassified Information in Federal 
Government Telecommunications and Automated Information 
Systems”) implemented NSDD 145 and “defined” sensitive but not 
classified information by leaving what was deemed sensitive to the 
discretion of each federal department and agency. This Poindexter 
memorandum also gave the National Security Agency the preeminent 
role in federal computer/communications security matters. 
Government agency representatives soon started acting on NSDD 
145 and NTISSP #2 provisions. In 1986, Mead Data Central and other 
database creators and vendors were reporting visits by DoD, FBI, and 
CIA representatives seeking to limit foreign access, through legal 
and technological means, to databases which might contain easily 
aggregated sensitive information. Widespread protests against this 
practice and the Poindexter memorandum resulted in the rescission 
of NTISSP #2 by Poindexter’s successor, Frank Carlucci, in March 
1987 (it is commonly believed that the rescission was largely decided 
by a desire to disassociate the Poindexter name from further 
controversy in the wake of the Iran-Contra scandal). Congress also 
responded definitively with the Computer Security Act of 1987 which 
limits the National Security Agency’s role in federal computer security 
to military agencies and assigns the National Bureau of Standards 
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(now National Institute of Standards and Technology) responsibility 
for computer security in all civilian agencies. However, NSDD 145 
still remains in effect. 
FUT~JREPROSPECTS 
The administration’s continuing concern with national security 
and its increasing control over related and potentially related 
information during the past decade appear to be continuing from 
the Carter to the Reagan and now into the Bush presidencies. Two 
days before his departure from office, President Reagan signed E.O. 
12267 which establishes “policies and procedures governing the 
assertion of Executive privilege by incumbent and former Presidents 
in connection with the release of Presidential records ...” (U.S. Office 
of the President, 1989, p. 1). The order sets up  procedures to review 
records of the present and former presidents and to invoke the 
executive privilege of secrecy by either if “disclosure...might impair 
the national security (including the conduct of foreign relations), 
law enforcement, or the deliberative processes of the Executive 
branch” (p. 1). According to this E.O., only a final court order can 
override an incumbent president’s claim of privilege. 
Press reports early in the Bush presidency state that the 
administration is circulating a draft executive order on classified 
information which would establish uniform standards for granting 
security clearances throughout the executive branch. It would also 
eliminate the requirement that agencies provide a reason for denial 
and the chance to respond for those federal employees and government 
contractors who are denied such clearances. This would remove all 
rights of due process in such instances. 
Congressional reaction to the draft proposal has been negative. 
Representative Don Edwards, chair of the House Judiciary 
Subcommittee on Civil and Constitutional Rights, urged Bush not 
to sign the draft version: “a person denied a clearance on the basis 
of erroneous information ...would never have an opportunity to correct 
i t  (Marcus, 1989, p. A4). The chairmen of six major House committees 
wrote to Bush to express their concern over the potential violation 
of civil rights and promised legislative action to counter that threat. 
Subsequently, in a March 24 memorandum, Bush authorized a 
complete review of the proposal by an interagency working group 
of lawyers who had not previously worked on the issue (Devroy & 
Marcus, 1989, p. A13). However, the final word on this question may 
be spoken by the judiciary. In Department of t he  Navy u. Egan, the 
Supreme Court decided that no one has the “right” to a security 
clearance and therefore “procedural safeguards derived from the 
common law may not be appropriate in security-clearance cases.” 
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However the saga of national security controls over information 
continues to unfold, the mechanisms for policy-making in this field 
at the federal level remain unchanged: Congressional statutory 
authority and supplemental “pressure” through oversight hearings, 
appropriations, and histories of legislative intent; executive initiatives 
such as presidential directives, executive agency development of 
regulations to accompany statutes, and contract provisions; and the 
relatively rarely applied powers of review of the judiciary. It remains 
for the interested citiLen, both proponent and opponent of the many 
forms of control now in existence, to monitor the actions of 
government and lobby in appropriate places to effect an optimal 
balance of needed security controls with freedom of information. 
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